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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SEX OFFENSES AND FREE 
SPEECH: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BAN ON SEX 
OFFENDERS’ USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA: IMPACT ON STATES 
WITH SIMILAR RESTRICTIONS 
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In Packingham v. North Carolina, the United States Supreme Court 
held that a North Carolina statute, which barred registered sex offenders 
from accessing a myriad of websites, including social networking websites, 
impermissibly restricts lawful speech in violation of the First Amendment’s 
Free Speech Clause, applicable to the States under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court illustrated its decision under the 
Constitution as well as through its precedents.  In reaching its decision, the 
Court noted two main reasons for the statute’s impermissibility.  First, the 
statute’s broad wording not only restricts access to social media websites, 
but due to the statute’s elements, it encompasses many and varying web-
sites.  Second, the Court found that this far reaching restriction on speech is 
unprecedented in the range of speech that it is abridging; essentially result-
ing in a total ban on the exercise of First Amendment speech on social net-
working sites that are imperative to participating in modern society.  
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I. FACTS 
Under North Carolina law, it was a felony for a registered sex offender 
“to access a commercial social networking Web site where the sex offender 
knows that the site permits minor children to become members or to create 
or maintain personal web pages on the commercial social networking Web 
site.”1  North Carolina’s statute bans registered sex offenders from Web 
sites that meet four requirements.2  First, if the Web site is “operated by a 
person who derives revenue from membership fees, advertising, or other 
                                                      
1. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1733 (2017) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 14-202.5(a), (e) (West 2015)). 
2. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1733 (quoting § 14-202.5(b)). 
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sources related to the operation of the Web site.”3  Second, if it “[f]acilitates 
the social introduction between two or more persons for the purposes of 
friendship, meeting other persons, or information exchanges.”4  Third, if it 
“[a]llows users to create Web pages or personal profiles that contain infor-
mation such as the name or nickname of the user, photographs placed on 
the personal Web page by the user, other personal information about the us-
er, and links to other personal Web pages on the commercial social net-
working Web site of friends or associates of the user that may be accessed 
by other users or visitors to the Web site.”5  And fourth, if it “[p]rovides us-
ers or visitors to the commercial social networking Web site mechanisms to 
communicate with other users, such as a message board, chat room, elec-
tronic mail, or instant messenger.”6 
In 2002, Petitioner, Lester Gerard Packingham, a 21-year-old student, 
had sex with a 13-year-old girl.7  Subsequently, Packingham was charged 
and pleaded guilty to “taking indecent liberties with a child.”8  Under North 
Carolina law, Packingham’s crime qualified as “an offense against a mi-
nor,” which carried with it the requirement to register as a sex offender – “a 
status that can endure for 30 years or more.”9  
In 2010, after having a parking ticket dismissed, Packingham posted an 
exclamatory status to his Facebook account, stating: 
 
Man God is Good! How about I got so much favor they dismissed 
the ticket before court even started? No fine, no court cost, no 
nothing spent……Praise be to GOD, WOW! Thanks JESUS!10 
 
Per North Carolina law, Packingham’s above quoted statement on Fa-
cebook was in violation of N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5 (2015).11  As 
a registered sex offender, Packingham was banned from accessing commer-
cial social networking sites.12  Packingham’s statement posted to Facebook 
was spotted by a police officer employed by the Durham Police Department 
who was investigating registered sex offenders who were suspected to have 
                                                      
3. Id. at 1733-34. 
4. Id. at 1734. 
5. Id. 
6. § 14-202.5(b)(4). 
7. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1734. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
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been violating § 14-202.5.13  Packingham’s personal Facebook account was 
under the name “J.R.Gerrard,” and after the police officer cross-referenced 
recent court records, the officer confirmed that Packingham had recently 
had a traffic ticket dismissed.14  Subsequent to a search warrant, evidence 
was uncovered to prove that “J.R. Gerrard” was in fact Lester Packingham, 
a registered sex offender, who was accessing a social media website in vio-
lation of § 14-202.5.15 
Packingham was indicted by a grand jury for violating § 14-202.5.16 
Packingham sought to have the indictment dismissed on First Amendment 
grounds, but it was denied.17  Packingham was convicted in state court even 
though the State, at no point, alleged that Packingham had committed any 
crime while on the internet.18  
On appeal to the Court of Appeals of North Carolina, Packingham ar-
gued that § 14-202.5 violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amend-
ment.19  The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court; holding that § 14-
202.5 “is not narrowly tailored to serve the State’s legitimate interest in pro-
tecting minors from sexual abuse.”20  However, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court ultimately reversed.21  That court found that § 14-202.5 did not 
violate the First Amendment, but was “constitutional in all respects.”22  Fur-
ther finding that the law was merely a “limitation on conduct,” not a limita-
tion of speech.23  The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted 
certiorari.24 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Both historically and as of late, laws applicable to registered sex of-
fenders have been among the most controversial.  Even more compelling is 
how these laws intersect with the First Amendment and social media.  As 
stated by the Court, Packingham is “one of the first this Court has taken to 
address the relationship between the First Amendment and the modern In-
                                                      
13. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1734. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1734. 
20. Id. at 1734-35. 
21. Id. at 1735. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
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ternet.”25  The Court illustrated its analysis and decision through precedents 
and statistics supporting the prevalence of social media in modern society.26 
A. THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION  
In pertinent part the First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to peti-
tion the Government for a redress of grievances.”27 
At issue in Packingham is the Free Speech provision of the First 
Amendment.  If a law functions to regulate or interfere with an individual’s 
right to free speech, a state must show that it has either a significant or 
compelling interest that it’s regulation will achieve in furthering.28  The in-
terest a state must prove hinges on which level of scrutiny the Court will 
examine the law under.29  Specifically, if a law is content-based, namely, if 
the law distinguishes between the content of speech on its face, the law will 
be subject to strict scrutiny.30  Alternatively, if a regulation of speech 
“serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression,” that regulation is 
subject to intermediate scrutiny.31 
Furthermore, a state may enact regulations on speech if the law merely 
regulates the place or time speech may be made regardless of the content of 
the speech.32  The United States Supreme Court has examined laws under 
the intermediate scrutiny standard if such law was a time, place, or manner 
regulation.33  A content-neutral time, place, or manner regulation on speech 
may be upheld if it is “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 
interest and . . . [it] leave[s] open ample alternative channels for communi-
cation of the information.”34  A law is narrowly tailored if it does not “bur-
den substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s 
legitimate interests.”35 
                                                      
25. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736. 
26. See id. at 1735-38. 
27. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
28. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2748-49 (1989). 
29. Id. 
30. See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2522-23 (2014). 
31. Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2754. 
32. See id. at 2757-58. 
33. Id. 
34. Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2753 (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 
U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). 
35. See McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2523 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 
2746, 2534-40 (1989)). 
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B. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PRIOR TO THE MODERN INTERNET 
Historically, the Court has made clear that First Amendment speech is 
protected within certain public physical spaces, such as parks.36  Specifical-
ly, in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Court upheld a New York City’s 
restriction on the volume of a rock performance in Central Park; finding 
that the restriction was a permissible time, place, and manner restriction that 
did not discriminate based on content.37  In Ward, the Court explained that 
New York City’s regulation was narrowly tailored to serve its substantial 
and content-neutral interest in controlling volume, and the tranquility of 
private homes, which satisfied intermediate scrutiny.38  Further, the Court 
noted that governmental protection in no way is limited to that context, but 
the government may seek to protect “even such traditional public forums as 
city streets and parks.”39 Twenty-eight years after Ward, the Court deter-
mined that physical places such as city streets and parks remain important 
spaces to gather and express views, but now, it is clear that the most im-
portant place for exchanging views, and protesting others, is the Internet.40  
C. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE MODERN INTERNET 
In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, the First Amendment was 
introduced to the modern Internet.41  In that case, the Court struck down 
two provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996; specifically, 
provisions that were designed to protect minors from “obscene or indecent” 
communications on the Internet.42  The Court explained that said provisions 
were content-based restrictions on speech, and overly broad because the law 
prohibited unprotected as well as protected speech.43  Further, the Court de-
termined that “the growth of the Internet has been and continues to be phe-
nomenal.”44  As such, the Court stressed the importance of the freedom of 
expression in a democratic society – in “the vast democratic fora of the In-
ternet.”45  For these reasons, the Court found the law unconstitutional.46 
                                                      
36. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017). 
37. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2756 (1989). 
38. Id. at 2760. 
39. Id. at 2756. 
40. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735. 
41. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 (1997). 
42. Id. at 2351. 
43. Id. at 2342. 
44. Id. at 2351. 
45. Id. at 2343. 
46. Id. at 2351. 
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Twenty years have since passed since the ruling in Reno v. American 
Civil Liberties Union, where the Court predicted the phenomenal growth of 
the Internet.47  Today, in 2018, 81% of the United States population holds a 
social media account.48  Additionally, approximately 185 million Ameri-
cans used social media in 2016, a number predicted to reach 200 million 
people by the year 2020.49  The Court used similar statistics to describe the 
prevalence and utility of social media in today’s modern culture to depict 
how individuals take to his or her social media account to “engage in a wide 
array of protected First Amendment activity.”50  Facebook serves as an out-
let to discuss religion and politics with friends, as well as a forum to share 
other personal thoughts and images.51  LinkedIn can be used as a tool to 
network with professionals in an individual’s field of work, or to receive 
employment openings or advice.52  Twitter is a forum to follow political 
leaders, where an individual could petition the same, and engage in a myri-
ad of activity.53  As such, the Court discussed how the “Cyber Age is a rev-
olution of historic proportions,” stating: “The forces and directions of the 
Internet are so new, so protean, and so far reaching that courts must be con-
scious that what they say today might be obsolete tomorrow.”54 
Subsequently, Packingham is one of the first cases the Court has decid-
ed to address the First Amendment and the modern Internet.55  Given the 
enormous impact that social media has on our society’s culture, the Court 
proceeded with “extreme caution” as to not suggest that the First Amend-
ment provides little protection to United States citizens wishing to partici-
pate in that space.56 
III. ANALYSIS  
In Packingham v. North Carolina, the United States Supreme Court 
ruled that § 14-202.5 could not stand because the statute’s broad wording 
not only barred registered sex offenders from social media websites, but al-
                                                      
47. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2351 (1997). 
48. Percentage of U.S. population with a social media profile 2008-2017 STATISTA (Aug. 9, 
2017, 7:44 PM), https://www.statista.com/statistics/273476/percentage-of-us-population-with-a-
social-network-profile/. 
49. Id. 
50. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735-36 (2017). 
51. Id. at 1735. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 1736. 
55. Id. 
56. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736. 
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so encompassed a vast array of unrelated websites.57  This far reaching re-
striction on protected speech, which is unprecedented in its scope, could not 
satisfy even intermediate scrutiny.58  Overall, the Court concluded that § 
14-202.5 violated the Constitution.59  Lastly, the Court considered the 
State’s argument; specifically, the law’s important and preventative purpose 
of protecting minors from registered sex offenders, but found that the State 
did not meet its burden to show that the law is “necessary or legitimate to 
serve that purpose.”60 
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION: NORTH CAROLINA STATUTE § 14-202.5 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL  
On June 19, 2017, the Supreme Court unanimously decided Packing-
ham v. North Carolina in favor of the Petitioner.61  Justice Kennedy deliv-
ered the opinion for the majority.62  Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan joined in the majority opinion.63 
1. American Revolution 
The Court relied on its prior decisions to illustrate its ruling.64  McCul-
len v. Coakly stands for the proposition that in order to survive intermediate 
scrutiny, a law must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmen-
tal interest.”65  Further, McCullen provides that “the law must not burden 
substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s le-
gitimate interest.”66  The Court made certain to note that a state, without 
doubt, has an interest in protecting children and other victims of sexual as-
sault from abuse, and that the “sexual abuse of a child is a most serious 
crime”; however, that interest is not exempt from all constitutional protec-
tions.67  
The Court went on to explain “that for centuries now, inventions her-
alded as advances in human progress have been exploited by the criminal 
                                                      
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 1736. 
59. Id. at 1738. 
60. Id. 
61. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1733. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or de-
cision of this case. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. See id., 137 S. Ct. at 1735-38. 
65. Id. at 1736 (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2534 (2014)). 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 1736 (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002)). 
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mind.”68  Essentially the Court demonstrated how our society is continuous-
ly changing and adapting, thus the Court needed to adapt with it by consid-
ering advances in science and the social context.69  In Packingham, the 
Court was given the task of protecting minors, while simultaneously pro-
tecting individual’s First Amendment rights in light of today’s moral, polit-
ical and cultural climate.70  Packingham is a novelty, and the Court noted 
that its prior cases and legislative history may not show the actual extent of 
the application of the First Amendment to the new frontier of the Internet.71  
2. Overbreadth 
Furthermore, the Court agreed that a State may enact specific, narrowly 
tailored laws to prevent a sex offender from engaging in criminal conduct; 
however, North Carolina’s law banning registered sex offenders from social 
media websites was so broad that the Court determined that it was unprece-
dented in the scope of protected speech it abridges.72  
Given the wording and construction of § 14-202.5, North Carolina’s 
law banned not only Facebook, but a myriad of websites, such as 
Webmd.com, which have nothing to do with the State’s purported interest 
of protecting minors from sex offenders gathering his or her personal in-
formation.73  Again, the Court stressed that this opinion should not be read 
as a bar on states enacting specific laws to prevent criminal behavior.74  Ra-
ther, the Court stressed that the law just must be more narrowly tailored 
than § 14-202.5.75  As illustrated in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court struck 
down the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act, which made it a crime to advo-
cate for violence, as unconstitutional.76  In Brandenburg, the Petitioner, a 
member of the Ku Klux Klan, challenged Ohio’s law on First Amendment 
grounds.77  Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Petitioner, 
holding that the law violated the Petitioner’s right to free speech.78  Even 
so, in that case, the Court made certain that “[s]pecific criminal acts are not 
                                                      
68. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736. 
69. See id. 
70. See id. 
71. See id. 
72. Id. at 1737. 
73. Id. 
74. See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737. 
75. Id. 
76. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 89 S. Ct. 1827, 1830 (1969). 
77. Id. at 1828. 
78. Id. at 1830. 
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protected speech even if speech is the means for their commission.”79  The 
same guidance was given in Packingham.80 
As such, the Court found that North Carolina’s law did not punish spe-
cific criminal acts, but barred sex offenders from engaging in protected 
speech on social media completely.81  As stated before, social media today 
functions as a device to share ideas, religious views, and access to United 
States elected officials.82  Given the same, if that access was denied, the 
Court stated that it would be comparable to denying that same individual 
the right to speak in public streets or parks.83 
In general, the State’s argument centered on the importance of keeping 
minors and victims of sexual abuse safe.84  The State argued that § 14-202.5 
was merely a content-neutral, time, place or manner restriction, subject to 
intermediate scrutiny.85  Further, the State argued that § 14-202.5 set out 
four requirements, as to only limit sex offenders from accessing websites 
where he or she could use minor’s personal information in order to target 
them.86  The Court, even assuming that the above arguments were true, 
could not let the law stand.87  
3.  Majority’s Conclusion 
For the reasons stated above, the Court ruled the North Carolina statute 
unconstitutional.88  Because § 14-202.5 impermissibly restricted lawful 
speech in violation of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause, the Court 
struck it down as unconstitutional.89  Additionally, the Court considered the 
Respondents’ arguments related to prevention, and found them nonetheless 
unpersuasive.90 
B. THE CONCURRING OPINION 
Even though the Court was unanimous in its decision to strike down § 
14-202.5, Justices Alito, Roberts, and Thomas joined and authored a con-
                                                      
79. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737. 
80. See Brandenburg, 89 S. Ct. at 1827. 
81. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737. 
82. See id. 
83. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735. 
84. Id. at 1737. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 1736. 
88. Id. at 1738. 
89. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738. 
90. Id. at 1737. 
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currence.91  The concurring opinion was in agreement about North Caroli-
na’s law’s “staggering reach,” stating that § 14-202.5 barred sex offenders 
from websites that could not reasonably lead to the abuse of minors.92  
However, where the three concurring justices could not agree with the 
majority is when its rhetoric compared the Internet to public streets and 
parks.93  Most significantly, the concurrence warned that some may inter-
pret the majority’s language to mean that the State may not be able to re-
strict sex offenders from any websites or regulate speech on the Internet.94  
In retrospect, Justice Alito’s statement, “I am troubled by the implications 
of the Court’s unnecessary rhetoric,”95 may have been foreshadowing to the 
challenges that sex offenders are likely, and already have brought against 
their states’ laws restricting his or her access to the modern Internet. 
IV. IMPACT 
The Packingham v. North Carolina ruling may have an impact on 
states with similar restrictions on sex offenders.  The Packingham decision 
has already been cited and used to challenge a probation condition in United 
States v. Rock.96  In that case, Defendant was charged and pleaded guilty to 
one count of distribution of child pornography.97  The crime leading to De-
fendant’s charge was the fact that Defendant took pictures of then girl-
friend’s eleven-year-old daughter naked, and distributed them on the inter-
net.98  Subsequently, the Defendant took an appeal to challenge the length 
of his sentence and the conditions of his release.99  Here, the Defendant ar-
gued that the condition he not possess or use a computer, goes against the 
Court’s ruling in Packingham v. North Carolina.100  The D.C. Court found 
this argument unpersuasive because the Defendant’s release condition was 
not a post-custodial restriction as was in Packingham.101  Further, that court 
stated, “a court granting probation may impose reasonable conditions that 
deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.”102  
                                                      
91. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738 (Alito, J., concurring). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. See id. 
95. Id. 
96. United States v. Rock, 863 F.3d 827, 831 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
97. Id. at 829. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 831. 
101. Id. 
102. Rock, 863 F.3d at 831 (quoting United States v. Knights, 122 S. Ct. 587, 591 (2001)). 
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As illustrated above, the warning from Justice Alito, who wrote for the 
concurrence in Packingham, may already be proving true.103  North Dakota 
imposes restrictions on sex offenders that are similar to the one challenged 
in United States v. Rock.104  As such, it is likely that North Dakota defend-
ants will use Packingham’s decision to challenge such restrictions.  
A. NORTH DAKOTA PROBATION CONDITIONS APPLIED TO SEX 
OFFENDERS 
In North Dakota, a sex offender is subject to probation conditions at a 
judge’s discretion.105  Specifically, a judge may impose that a registered sex 
offender “must not subscribe to any Internet service provider, by modem, 
LAN, DSL or any other manner.”106  Furthermore, the judge may order that 
such an individual, “may not use another person’s Internet or use Internet 
through any commercial venue until and unless approved in writing by [a] 
parole/probation officer.”107  
Like the challenge in United States v. Rock, North Dakota defendants 
may challenge such a restriction on First Amendment grounds.108  It is like-
ly that a North Dakota Court would render a similar decision as the Rock 
Court. However, it is impossible to say with certainty. 
B. PACKINGHAM’S EFFECTS ON NORTH DAKOTA SPECIFIC LAWS 
 In the 2003 case of State v. Backlund,109 the North Dakota Supreme 
Court considered a constitutional challenge to N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20.05, 
which makes it a crime for an adult to lure minors by computer or other 
electronic means.110  In that case, the defendant argued that North Dakota’s 
law violates the free speech provisions of the federal and state constitu-
tions.111  Interestingly, the defendant used a similar legal argument as the 
petitioner in Packingham.112  In Backlund, the defendant declared that 
North Dakota’s law was overbroad, as there was no communication to a 
minor, and that it was a content-based restriction on his right to free speech, 
                                                      
103. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1738 (2017). 
104. See N.D.R.Crim.P. Form 9. 
105. See id. 
106. N.D.R.Crim.P. Form 9. 
107. Id. 
108. See United States v. Rock, 863 F.3d 827, 831 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
109. State v. Backlund, 2003 ND 184, ¶ 1, 672 N.W.2d 431. 
110. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-05.1. 
111. Id. ¶ 18, 672 N.W.2d at 438. 
112. See id. 
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and not narrowly tailored to serve the states legitimate interest.113  Howev-
er, the North Dakota Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument, 
finding that § 12.1-20-05.1 does not violate the free speech clause of the 
state and federal constitutions.114  The Court reasoned that North Dakota’s 
law does not allow for prosecution of “pure” speech, but merely criminaliz-
es conduct directed at “luring” and abusing minors.115 
After Packingham, North Dakota may see similar challenges to its laws 
and restrictions placed on sex offenders, and perhaps the North Dakota Su-
preme Court’s conclusion will be different than in Backlund.  However, 
North Dakota’s law is more narrowly tailored than the law in North Caroli-
na, and its restrictions are placed on registered sex offenders still under su-
pervision, not post-supervision.116  Although, after the ruling in Packing-
ham, it is impossible to state with certainty which direction the North 
Dakota Supreme Court would go after fourteen years since the ruling in 
Backlund.  Ultimately, the future impact of Packingham is difficult to pre-
dict because the “[t]he forces and directions of the Internet are so new, so 
protean, and so far-reaching that courts must be conscious that what they 
say today might be obsolete tomorrow.”117  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Overall, in Packingham v. North Carolina, the United States Supreme 
Court struck down a North Carolina law barring registered sex offenders 
from accessing social networking websites (and because of the law’s broad 
language, a myriad of other web sites as well) as unconstitutional.118  Pack-
ingham is one of the first modern Internet cases decided by the Court, so its 
holding will likely have an impact on other states with similar laws or re-
strictions, including North Dakota.119 
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